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Through the examination of documents pertaining to the United States policies 
toward Indonesia, this paper studies how Washington viewed Indonesia almost 
three decades after colonialism had been officially over. More specifically, this 
paper studies U.S. assistance programs provided for Indonesia during the 
administration of President Richard M. Nixon. By using the perspective of 
postcolonial studies on international relations, it shows that while on the surface 
the assistance programs of the Nixon administration appeared to be altruistic and 
helpful, a deeper look at them shows that the programs were imbued with 
subliminal Eurocentric liberal international theory of international relations. It 
further shows that the administration’s programs were not only self-serving, but 
were also implemented with an orientalist spirit by the United States as part of the 
“superior” West over Indonesia that was considered part of the East and therefore 
was “inferior” and in need of help from the West. In light of Edward Said’s 
postcolonial studies of West and East relations, the policies clearly reflect 
orientalist views and practices, even long after colonialism formally ended. 
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Introduction 
During the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969), the 
United States (US) was hostile toward Indonesia (Robinson, 2018; Roosa, 2020; 
Wardaya, 2012). Among the reasons for the hostility was Washington’s view of 
President Sukarno as being not only pro-communist but also anti-Western, 
resulting in the leftist political and economic system that had caused Indonesia’s 
economic troubles. Washington was also unhappy with Sukarno’s favorable 
attitudes toward the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI); his refusal to join the 
Western side of the Cold War; and his maintaining close relations with the 
People’s Republic of China (Wardaya, 2007). In the eyes of Washington, 
Sukarno’s actions were an indication of his opposition to the U.S. Washington 
then began to seek ways to undermine President Sukarno and his leftist supporters 
 





while hoping to replace President Sukarno with a pro-Western leader, as shown 
by a sizeable body of research (e.g. Clark & Mortimer, 1975; Hess, 1974; Taylor, 
2019). 
A great opportunity for the US to turn tables in Indonesia came when 
beginning in mid-1965, and following the accusation that the PKI was launching a 
move to take over the government, between 500 thousand and one million 
members and sympathizes of the communist party were massacred (Robinson, 
2018). Many more were imprisoned and exiled, while the party was destroyed and 
officially banned (Roosa, 2020). When in 1967 General Suharto officially took 
over power from President Sukarno in the wake of the mass violence, Washington 
was pleased and took a different approach toward Indonesia. It changed course 
from being hostile to Indonesia into being friendly toward it (Easter, 2010; 
Simpson, 2020; Bevins, 2020). Washington began to fully support the government 
of President Suharto. The support became more explicit when in the US the 
administration of S. President Johnson ended and was succeeded by the 
administration of President Richard M. Nixon of 1969-1974. 
Under the Nixon administration, Washington provided various assistance 
programs to help the pro-Western government of President Suharto. Among the 
assistance programs were: (a) building close personal relations between President 
Nixon and President Suharto; (b) supporting the Suharto government in its effort 
to diminish the influence of President Sukarno in Indonesian politics; (c) helping 
Indonesia through the Paris Club, a consortium of Western nations that would 
provide loan for Indonesia; (d) using international institutions to help the Suharto 
government re-build Indonesia’s economy; and (e) encouraging the Suharto 
government to play greater role in Southeast Asia. 
That being said, this present study would argue that President Nixon’s policy 
has orientalist predispositions, i.e. Indonesia remains the subordinate Other in the 
US-Indonesia relation. In his foundational work Orientalism, Edward Said argues 
that for a long period of time Europe and the West in general described people 
outside the Western world (also known as the “East” or the “Orient”) in a specific 
way. They mostly depicted the people of the so-called East as ”irrational, 
psychologically weak, and feminized” (Said, 2003).  According to Said, such a 
depiction of the people of the Orient helped the West to dominate and colonize 
non-Western people. Following the end of the colonial period at the conclusion of 
the Second World War, Western domination continued, including the domination 
that was done by the United States (Said, 2003, p. 18). In the absence of formal 
colonization, he further argues, the West continues to exploit the human and 
natural resources of non-Western nations to serve its own purposes (Said, 2003).  
In explaining the scope of orientalism, Said states that orientalism 
encompasses different dimensions, which are interdependent of each other. Other 
than being an academic field and “a style of thought based upon an ontological 
and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ... ‘the Occident’”, 
according to Said, orientalism is also “as a Western style for dominating, 
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 2003, pp. 2–3). He 
believes that, again, these dimensions of orientalism continued to influence the 
West’s views and practices after the end of colonialism or the post-colonial 
period. For Said this is clearly reflected in the fact that even after the age of 
colonialism was formally over, “[t]he relationship between Occident and Orient is 
 





a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex 
hegemony…”(Said, 2003, p. 5). 
Implementing Said’s views on the West’s attitudes toward non-European 
nations, (Hobson, (2012) argues that such approach and attitudes were continued 
to be implemented in Western nations’ diplomatic relations with the people 
outside the Western world. According to Hobson, during the pre-1945 period the 
dominant international relations theories were explicitly Eurocentric, in which 
Europe was depicted as the main source of ideas for modern international system, 
known as the “Eurocentric Big-Bang theory of world politics”.  In the post-1945 
period the explicit Eurocentric theory was abandoned. It was replaced by what 
Hobson later construes as the liberal international theory.  
Although the liberal international theory abandoned explicit Eurocentrism, 
according to Hobson, in practice it continues to carry remnants of the explicit 
Eurocentrism, albeit subliminally, hence “subliminal eurocentrism” (Hobson, 
2012, p. 214). Thus, Hobson continues, although in the liberal international theory 
“there is no explicit discussion of ‘civilizations versus barbarians’, or of ‘whites 
versus non-whites’,” in practice “the traditional civilization/barbarism discourse is 
sublimated rather than exorcized” (Hobson, 2012, p. 214). Within the liberal 
international theory itself, as reported by Hobson, there are two more-specific 
theories, namely English School theory and the Neo-liberal Institutional theory. 
While the English School theory is explicitly Eurocentric, the Neoliberal 
Institutional theory carries Eurocentrism subliminally, through supporting 
European-initiated international institutions (Hobson, 2012, pp. 215–216). 
With regard to the English School theory of international relations 
(henceforth ES), Hobson provides some key features. In general, the ES tends to 
award the East “various degrees of agency”, but “these are always inferior to the 
pioneering agency that is awarded to the West.”  More specifically, the East is 
“awarded emulative ‘conditional agency’ whereby it assimilates the institutions 
and practices that were pioneered by the Europeans as they were delivered 
courtesy of the Western civilizing mission, ultimately so that the East could join, 
and therefore enjoy the benefits of, Western international society.”  Further, the 
ES awards the East “a degree of ‘predatory agency’, ...  in which the refusal to 
fully Westernize gives rise to the contemporary ‘Eastern problem’ that in turn 
destabilizes both global international society/world order and Western 
civilization” (Hobson, 2012, pp. 214–215). According to Hobson, ES theory 
“visualizes IR through the Eurocentric ‘big-bang theory’ of world politics.” By 
using the big-bang theory, adherents of ES believe that “Europe pioneered 
development and self-generated through the Eurocentric logic of immanence 
before exporting its institutions (via imperialism) to the East in order to remake 
the world as far as possible in its own image” (Hobson 2012: 215). 
Concerning the Neoliberal Institutional theory (henceforth NLI), Hobson 
explains that it “...does not openly advocate imperialism and ostensibly rejects it” 
(Hobson, 2012, p. 216).  However, he suggests that “a paternalist conception of 
neo-imperialism creeps in through the [NLI’s] sub-liminal Eurocentric back door” 
(Hobson, 2012, p. 216). He further argues that by adherents of NLI  “key 
international institutions are portrayed as paternalist Western vehicles” needed to 
help  “the cultural conversion of Third World states to Western liberal-
civilizational precepts” (Hobson, 2012, p. 216). According to Hobson, NLI 
 





adherents do not usually discuss “the rise of the West and the rise of the Western 
state, given the theory’s lack of interest in historical international systems.” 
Instead they prefer to discuss “Western states as fully formed and then considers 
how they subsequently come together to create and reproduce the major 
international institutions through iterated cooperation” (Hobson, 2012, pp. 215–
216) 
Using Hobsonian postcolonial approach of the liberal international theory, 
this paper intends to show that despite their altruistic impression, in practice 
Washington’s assistance programs were self-serving.  More importantly this paper 
will show that the assistance programs were conducted with orientalist approach, 
in which the U.S. perceived itself as part of the “superior” West, while perceiving 
Indonesia as part of the “inferior” East. This paper will further show that when 
viewed from the perspective of postcolonial studies of international relations, the 
Nixon administration’s assistance programs were permeated with features of the 
English School theory and the Neoliberal Institutional theory of international 
relations. This study will use these features to observe elements within the 




This study is a qualitative research using document analysis method (Bowen, 
2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2012; Rapley, 2011).  Document analysis method is “a 
systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and 
electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen, 2009, p. 
27). As further stated by Bowen, “[l]ike other analytical methods in qualitative 
research, document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in 
order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge” 
(Bowen, 2009, p. 27). The analytic procedure of this paper involves “finding, 
selecting, appraising (making sense of), and synthesizing data contained in 
documents” (Bowen, 2009, p. 28). The research results are then organized into 
major themes, categories, and case examples specifically through content analysis 
(Bowen, 2009; Labuschagne, 2003). In this current study, the data gained were 
interpreted using Hobson’s liberal international relations theory with its two 
branches, namely the English School theory and the Neoliberal Institutional 
theory. 
As for the data source, they were procured from an archival research on 
documents stored at the Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in 
Yorba Linda, California, USA and at the National Archives, College Parks, 
Maryland, USA, in 2014 and 2017 respectively. The documents are memoranda 
of conversation among foreign-policy makers, diplomatic memos and diplomatic 
communication pertaining to policies of the United Sates under President Nixon 
toward Indonesia under the government of President Suharto.  
 
Findings and Discussion 
This section details the five features of the US-Indonesia international 









Granting the East with “emulative” or “conditional” agency 
According to Hobson, the ES theory grants the East with “emulative” or 
“conditional” agency. By this he suggests that the ES theory regards the East as 
being keen on imitating and reproducing political values and institutions that had 
been produced by the West, even after the success of the decolonization process. 
This view makes the adherents of the ES theory confident that all the political 
values and institutions of the West are also good for the East (Hobson, 2012; 
Watson, 1987). 
Applied on the case of US-Indonesian relations during the Nixon 
administration, one can see that such a view was present, albeit implicitly. A 
document titled “Briefing Book for Nixon Trip to Indonesia” clearly reflects such 
a view when it describes Suharto as a political leader from the East, in this case 
from Indonesia. The document describes the Indonesian president as having 
“limited experience as a statesman” while declaring that “he is still a bit unsure  
of himself in the world arena.”(NARA/National Archives and Record 
Administration, Document No. 690709, 1969, p.3). Based on this observation 
President Nixon’s policymakers suggested that the US President should build a 
personal relationship with Suharto (“NARA Document No. 690203, ‘Memo for 
Kissinger on Indo Econ Performance and US Aid,’” 1969). They believed that a 
close personal relations between the two leaders would provide “reinforcement for 
achieving understanding and cooperation on range of USG-GOI [United States 
Government-Government of Indonesia] relationships.”(NARA Document No. 
690816, 1969, p. 3). Seen from the ES theory what the policymakers’s belief 
implies that through personal relationship with Nixon, Suharto would be able to 
emulate the American President in coducting affairs in international political 
arena while strengthening US-Indonesian relations. 
In the document, the policymakers also urged President Nixon to “encourage 
Indonesia to continue its sound internal economic policies”. For these officials, 
the “economic policies” were certainly the same economic policies that the US 
was using, namely the capitalist economic policies. By imitating the US in using 
the capitalist economic policies these policymakers believed that Indonesia would 
be economically proseour just like the US. Implicitly they also suggested that 
Indonesia should abandon the populist or socialist economic policies that had 
been implemented by President Sukarno. Such a belief, in turn, reflected what 
Hobson says about the English School theory’s feature of seeing the East as 
imitator of Western political values and institutions of the West. 
 
Viewing the East as a “predatory” agency 
Hobson argues that the ES theory grants the East not only with emulative or 
conditional agency, but also with “predatory” agency, especially to Eastern 
leaders who refused to embrace Western political values and institutions. As 
further explained by Hobson, ES theorists believe that Eastern leaders refused 
those values and institutions eventually caused problems not only for their 
respective states but also for the political world order in general (Hobson, 2012, 
pp. 214–215). 
In the case of US-Indonesian relations, such a view was clearly reflected in 
the Nixon administration’s regard for President Sukarno. In the administration’s 
view, Sukarno was an Eastern leader who rejected Western political values and 
 





institutions as shown in Sukarno’s refusal to join the Western side of the Cold 
War, and therefore the administration regarded him as a “predatory” agency. 
Sukarno was also viewed as rejecting Western political values and institutions by 
adopting populist economic system while building close relations with communist 
nations (such as with People’s republic of China) and preventing Western 
corporations to invest in Indonesia. As a result, in the view of the ES theory, 
Sukarno was causing various problems. Among the problems were Indonesia’s 
“shattered economy”, the creation of  “communism as a domestic political force” 
and iresponsible regional cooperation and leadership in Southeast Asia, as one 
doccumment entitled “Indonesia Annual Policy Review and Assessment” dated  
February 16, 1970 shows (NARA Document No.700216, 1970, p. 2). 
It was not surprising then, that in light of such a view the Nixon 
administration was willingly supporting the Suharto government in the effort to 
diminish Sukarno’s influence in Indonesian politics—an effort often called de-
Sukarnoization campaign (Adam, 2018). Trusting that the chief of the lingering 
support for Sukarno’s influence came from the Navy branch of the Indonesian 
armed forces, the the policymakers of the Nixon administration were pleased that 
“the purge of pro-Sukarno military leader currently underway in Jakarta is 
primarily aimed at settling old scores dating back to the Sukarno period and at 
removing elements, mainly from the Indonesia Navy, with potential for future 
disloyalty” (NARA Document No.700122, 1970. p. 1). These officials were 
hoping that the de-Sukarnoization campaign was “intended in the longer term to 
prepare the groundwork for an Army  victory in the 1971 elections by completing 
the process of de-Sukarnoization…” (NARA Document No. 700122, 1970, p. 1), 
in which the Army was considered more emulative toward the political values and 
institutions of the West since many of their officers had been trained in the U.S. In 
ES theory’s term, the Indonesian Army was a potential “emulative” or  
“conditional” agency of the East. 
The Nixon administration’s policymakers believed that by replacing Sukarno 
the predatory agency with President Suharto as an emulative agency, Indonesia 
would become in tune with U.S. interests and policies in Indonesia itself as well 
as with U.S. interests and policies in the Southeast Asian region. Stated in one of 
the administration’s documents called “Indonesia Annual Policy Review and 
Assessment”, dated February 16, 1970 as follows: 
 
With the replacement of Sukarno regime by a government under General Suharto,   
Indonesia has reversed directions and is now seeking, with some early success, to rebuild its 
shattered economy, to attract foreign investment, to eradicate communism as a domestic 
political force and to play a responsible role in regional cooperation and leadership 
(No.700216, 1970, p. 2).  
 
While Sukarno as the “predatory” agency was associated with “shattered 
economy”, Suharto as the “emulative” agency was expected not only to attract 
foreign capitals, but also to save Indonesia from communism and to make 











Implementing Subliminal Eurocentrism 
Hobson observes that the ES theory often views relations between West and 
East by using “Eurocentric ‘big-bang theory’ of world politics.” In light of this 
view, ES theorists believed that the West had endeavored to assimilate “the 
institutions and practices that were pioneered by the Europeans” and “delivered 
courtesy of the Western civilizing mission” to the East. The purpose of the West 
in this endeavor, in the view of the same ES theorists, is to make the East able “to 
join, and therefore enjoy the benefits of, Western international society” (Hobson, 
2012, p 214). 
Implemented in the case of US-Indonesian relations during the Nixon 
administration, such a view was evident when the administration joined the so-
called “Paris Club” in an effort to help Indonesia’s economic recovery. Paris Club 
was a consortium of mostly-European nations based in Paris, France, intended to 
provide loans for Indonesia. In return, members of the “club” expected to be given 
access to invest their capital in Indonesia and to extract Indonesia’s natural 
resources. The administration viewed the club as part of “the “institutions and 
practices that were pioneered by the Europeans” and wanted to join it in order to 
help deliver the “courtesy of the Western civilizing mission”, in this case to 
Indonesia, and Orient nation. Indeed, the developed countries’ urban design for 
Latin American and Asian countries post-1945 was helpful albeit its Orientalizing 
tendencies as shown by members of the Paris Club (Feridhanusetyawan & 
Pangestu, 2003; Hebbert, 2012). 
Guided by such a view, President Nixon’s advisers suggested that in order for 
the U.S. to help Indonesia recover from its economic instability, “we [the U.S.] 
participate fully with the ‘Paris Club’ of Indonesia’s creditors.”(NARA 
Document No. 690709, “Briefing Book for Nixon Trip to Indonesia” p. 10.). The 
participation was important, according to the advisers, because it would give 
opportunity for “other developed nations” to help Indonesia in the country’s 
economic recovery efforts. What they meant by “other developed nations” were 
certainly European nations. In other words these advisers were believers in the 
hyper-agency of Europe as the best solution for the problems of the emulative or 
conditional agency of the East. The attitudes of the advisers in turn, reflecting 
Hobson’s contention that in the NLI theory of international relations, “a 
paternalist conception of neo-imperialism” which, according to Hobson, “creeps 
in through the subliminal Eurocentric back door” (Hobson, 2012, p. 216). 
Approving International Institutions as Paternalist Western Vehicles 
Hobson argues that in the eyes of the NLI theory adherents “key international 
institutions are portrayed as paternalist Western vehicles” which was necessary to 
help “the cultural conversion of Third World states to Western liberal-
civilizational precepts” (Hobson, 2012, p. 216). In other words, NLI theorists 
support the idea of urging nations of the East to adhere to the policies of 
international institutions that are created by the West. 
In the case of US-Indonesian relations during the Nixon administration, this 
was clear from the US participation in (therefore support for) the Paris Club 
mentioned above. The Paris Club was seen as a “key international institution” and  
was utilized to urge Indonesia as a Third World state to embrace  the precepts of 
the West to becoming “liberal-civilizational” in the footsteps of the Western 
 





nations. Along this line, the Nixon administration paternalistically believed that 
“aid donors, foreign investors and the various international institutions” of the 
West will best cure Indonesia’s economic woes (NARA Document No. 690203, 
“Memo for Kissinger on Indo Econ Performance and US Aid”, February 3, 1969, 
p. 7.). The US also urged a similar international institution, namely the IGGI 
(Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia), to collaborate and help Indonesia 
(NARA Document No.700216, 1970).. Like the Paris Club, the IGGI was an 
association of multilateral governments of mostly Western nations, except Japan, 
that provided loans for Indonesia under Suharto to rebuild the country’s economy. 
Members of the IGGI included Japan, England, France, Australia, West Germany, 
Italy and the US itself.  
Although not publicly announced, some hidden political motives were also 
involved. “Our major objective in the political sector”, a report said, “is a 
friendly and cooperative  government which has a reasonable degree of support 
from the people” (NARA Document No. 700216, “Indonesia Annual Policy 
Review and Assessment”, February 16, 1970, p. 2). Meanwhile, “in the socio-
cultural sector, our [US] primary objective is the acceleration of modernization 
within a value structure compatible with our own” (No.700216, 1970, p. 1). 
Supporting International Cooperation 
Hobson also argues that in addition to approving international institutions as 
paternalist western vehicles NLI theorists also view “Western states as fully 
formed and then considers how they subsequently come together to create and 
reproduce the major international institutions through iterated cooperation” 
(Hobson, 2012, pp. 215–216). 
The formation of Paris Club and the IGGI to remedy Indonesia’s economic 
stability mentioned above clearly indicate such a view. Both institutions were 
international in nature, and together as fellow members of the “superior” West, 
they iterated cooperation among themselves in order to solve problems of the 
“inferior” East, in this case Indonesia (National Archives, 1969). 
The cooperation, however, was not merely to benefit the East. It was also to 
benefit the West itself. As stated in a document from the Nixon administration 
titled “Indonesia Annual Policy Review and Assessment”, among the aims of such 
international cooperation was to open Indonesia: 
 
to American trade and investment, by encouraging the effectivene use of foreign, including 
U.S., economic  assistance;  ...to encourage and improve the climate for the growth of 
private investment, both foreign and  domestic, as a major contribution to over-all 
economic development; ... to insure that Indonesia is a good  trading partner of the 
United States. (NARA Document No.700216, 1970, p.1.) 
 
Some political motives were also involved. “Our major objective in the 
political sector”, the document also stated, “is a friendly and cooperative  
government which has a reasonable degree of support from the people”. 
Meanwhile, it was further states that “in the socio-cultural sector, our [US] 
primary objective is the acceleration of modernization within a value structure 
compatible with our own.”(NARA Document No.700216, 1970, p. 2) 
Even within the East itself, the US wanted to encourage Indonesia to initiate 
international cooperation under the frame of US international politics. This was 
 





clear especially when the nixon administration provided military assistnce for the 
Suharto government.  The assistance was inteded for “the eventual cooperation of 
Indonesia with its neighbors in maintaining their collective and individual 
security.”( NARA Document No.700216, 1970, p. 2). In other words, military 
assistance to Indonesia was important to “assure Indonesian competence to 
maintain internal security and to encourage Indonesia’s interest in a responsible 
role in the security of the area friendly to U.S. interests” (NARA Document 
No.700216, 1970, p. 2). Because of that reason the administration was convinced 
that the US “should plan and implement a slightly enlarged program of military 
assistance...” (NARA Document No.700216, 1970, p. 2). 
Hobson himself dislikes the precepts of the English School and the Neoliberal 
Institutional theories of the international relations. However, by employing his 
depiction of the features of the two theories, this paper has shown that the U.S. 
policies toward Indonesia during the Nixon Administration clearly reflect features 
of both the English School and Neoliberal Institutional theories. It also became 
clear that despite the altruistic appearance of the administration’s policies (and the 
policies of the West in general) toward Indonesia, when looked from the 
perspective of the post-colonial international relations they show the signs of 
West’s attempts to continue dominate the East, even after colonialism officially 
ended. In the specific case of the Nixon administration’s “helps” and “assistance” 
for the Suharto government, we can see that the help and assistance were also 




This study has shown the orientalist crux of US-Indonesia relations following 
Hobson’s English School and the Neoliberal Institutional theories as parts of the 
liberal international theory of international relations between the West and the 
East in the post-colonial period.  Viewed from the perspective of postcolonial 
studies of international relations, the Nixon administration’s assistance programs 
were marked with features of the ES and NLI theories of East-West relations. 
These features include: considering the East as “emulative” or “conditional” 
agency; regarding the East as “predatory” agency; harboring subliminal 
Eurocentrism; approving international institutions as paternalist Western vehicles 
to exploit the East; and viewing international cooperation as a legitimate way for 
the West’s domination over the East.  
This study has also shown that the anti-Indonesian attitudes of the American 
policymakers during the government of the Indonesian President Sukarno took a 
different path in the wake of the anti-communist purge and the removal of the 
president in mid-1960s. When President Suharto came to power, and especially 
during President Richard Nixon administration, Washington became very 
supportive of the Indonesian government. The support included building personal 
relations between President Nixon and President Suharto; assisting Suharto in the 
“de-Sukarnoization” efforts; helping rebuilt Indonesian economy; helping 
Indonesian to join intern atonal financial institutions; and helping Indonesia play 
greater role in Southeast Asia.  
Finally, seen from Saidian postcolonial studies, the policies of the U.S. under 
the administration of President Nixon clearly reflected orientalist views and 
 





practices, despite the fact that colonialism had for so long disappeared. Therefore, 
this study suggests future research to pursue either by refuting such notions or 
examining the same issue from the perspective of the so-called “East” itself.  
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